The Copyright Box Model
Stephen T. Black*
“A country without a patent office and good patent laws is just a
crab and can’t travel any way but sideways and backwards.”
—Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property law is territorial in nature. That is why
intellectual property assets have always been favorites among
international tax planners. Rapid appreciation, even faster transfer times,
and a somewhat vague standard for appraisal and valuation make for an
interesting field of play. Transfer the assets to a low tax jurisdiction before
the appreciation begins, and you find yourself with a large income stream
that is taxed at a low rate. Miss the beat, and you have a large tax hit.
For these reasons, many nations have followed the lead of Ireland in
providing for so-called “patent box” schemes. These tax incentives
provide lower tax rates for corporations who agree to develop intellectual
property in the host country. With global IP royalties over $300 billion in
2014,1 a tax savings of a few percentage points quickly adds up.
But patents are not the only IP assets that can be developed and
licensed. Recently, the Dutch government realized this and expanded their
“patent box” regime and renamed it the “innovation box.”
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1. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2015 124, 139,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its15_trade_category_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9LDZ-CTFF]. However, some estimates have put the average growth rate for the intellectual property
market at over 10% annually. Intellectual Property Markets, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/eoutlook/stipolicyprofiles/interactionsforinnovation/intellectualpropertymarkets.htm
[https://perma.cc/2D6W-HVTP].
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While most of the world has focused on the interesting planning and
development opportunities afforded patents and so-called “high-tech
startups,” this Article will discuss the opportunities afforded by the lowerhanging fruit of copyrights and copyright royalties.
There are some 194 countries in the world today.2 Of those, 152 are
Contracting States in the Patent Cooperation Treaty.3 However, that does
not mean that patents are filed in all 152 countries, or even that all of those
countries maintain patent offices.
For 2015, high-income countries, of which there were fifty-six,
accounted for 53.5% of the world patent applications.4 In contrast, the
fifty-one low and lower-middle income countries accounted for only
2.7%.5 The disparity between high-income and low-income countries in
terms of their abilities to capture and exploit high technology IP is very
stark.
One way that these low-income countries can hope to participate in
world wealth is by attracting outside businesses to their shores. This
Article discusses the costs and infrastructure associated with developing a
world-class ecosystem to attract outside business that is ready and willing
to invest research and development (“R&D”) dollars in foreign
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the outlook is not good. It is expensive, in
terms of both human and financial capital, to support a high-tech
ecosystem capable of producing a high number of patent applications.
Because most patents are not valuable,6 one might ask if there is a better

2.
How
Many
Countries
Are
In
the
World?,
WORLD
ATLAS,
http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm [https://perma.cc/UYM8-C45U]; Matt Rosenberg, The
Number
of
Countries
in
the
World,
THOUGHTCO
(June
15,
2017),
https://www.thoughtco.com/number-of-countries-in-the-world-1433445
[https://perma.cc/6XXQ4Q9C].
3. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PCT APPLICANT’S GUIDE – INTERNATIONAL PHASE –
ANNEX A 1–2 (June 9, 2017), http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol1/annexes/annexa/ax_a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EAB-WQGB].
4. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2016 1,
34 (2016), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FJ72MSM].
5. Id.
6. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1526 (2005) (“It
is hard to imagine that just four years after paying $10,000-$30,000 for preparation and prosecution
of a patent application, the successful patentee would decide to let the patent expire rather than pay
the $900 maintenance fee. Nevertheless, this empirical study has found that 53.71% of all patentees
do allow their patents to expire . . . .”).
In truth, odds are stacked astronomically against inventors, and no marketing outfit can
change them. ‘There are around 1.5 million patents in effect and in force in this country,
and of those, maybe 3,000 are commercially viable,’ [Richard Maulsby, director of the
Office of Public Affairs for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office], says. ‘It’s a very small
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way for lower income nations to attract outside businesses willing to
develop IP.
This Article suggests that copyrights are a lower-hanging fruit, and
that by providing incentives for copyright development, developing
nations will spend less and reap more benefit. Part I will discuss a short
history of the patent box. Part II will ask why a copyright box might be
preferable. Parts III and IV will discuss criticisms of box schemes, and
then look at the OECD’s BEPS project in more detail. Part V will examine
what issues will govern the design and implementation of a copyright box.
I.

HISTORY OF THE BOX MODEL

Imagine a developing country—let’s call it Newland. Newland has a
middling economy and infrastructure. It wants to increase its tax base and
compete with the better-developed countries of the world. One way for
Newland to participate in world wealth is to attract outside business to its
shores.
Some countries have done so by implementing a patent box regime.
Patent boxes group the income generated by patents and tax it at low rates.7
By lowering the tax rate of intellectual property licensing income, the host
country attracts large R&D companies and high-technology start-ups,
generating wealth and promoting intellectual property development.
Because of the tax incentives created by patent box regimes, many nations
have followed the lead of Ireland, the original creator of the patent box.8
Companies caught on quickly: they realized that if they transferred their
assets to a low-tax jurisdiction before the appreciation began, they found
themselves with a large income stream taxed at a very low rate.
However, the patent box regime will not work for just any country.
The problem is that patent boxes assume the infrastructure necessary for
their creation. Countries that have not adopted a patent box are unlikely to
be able to do so without a more sophisticated infrastructure. For example,
some countries do not even have patent offices,9 and the disparity between
high-income and low-income countries in terms of their abilities to capture
and exploit high technology intellectual property is large. By 2014, the
percentage of patents that actually turn into products that make money for people. On top
of all that, to get ripped off for tens of thousands of dollars adds insult to injury.’
Karen E. Klein, Smart Answers, “Avoiding the Inventor’s Lament”, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 10, 2005.
7. Cherie L. Jones et al., Should the United States Enact a Patent Box?, THE TAX ADVISER (Nov.
1, 2016), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/nov/should-us-enact-patent-box.html [https://
perma.cc/TBL4-B2JW].
8. Tax Update: Irish 6.25% Knowledge Development Box, MASON HAYES & CURRAN (Oct. 27,
2015), https://www.mhc.ie/latest/insights/irish-6.25-knowledge-development-box.
9. See Directory of Intellectual Property Offices, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/urls.jsp [https://perma.cc/Y43Z-FP24].
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disparity had grown even larger: the eighty high-income countries
accounted for 58.4% of the world patent applications, while low and
lower-middle income countries accounted for only 3.1%.10
Newland finds itself in the latter category. It has no patent office and
very little existing R&D infrastructure. One might ask if there is a better
way for lower income nations to attract outside businesses looking to
develop intellectual property. While most of the world has focused on
patents and high-tech startups, patents are not the only intellectual property
assets that can be licensed. Moreover, patents are not the only intellectual
property assets that generate significant revenue.
Technology is one key to economic growth. In his 1957 paper, A
Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, economist Robert Solow
showed that “a large majority of economic growth per hour of labor in the
United States between 1909 and 1949 could be attributed to technological
advances.”11 For his effort, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1987.12
Since then, the world has accepted the importance technological
development plays in economic growth.13
If a developing nation wants to advance in terms of gross domestic
product, per capita income, or standing in the world economic stage, it
must have a stake in the world IP market. To progress towards achieving
this goal, tax incentives are one way that developing nations have sought
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in technology projects located
within their borders.14
After Ireland’s introduction of the patent box scheme, France and
Hungary were next to follow suit. Shortly after, other European
jurisdictions—including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Cyprus,
Liechtenstein, Malta, Spain, and the United Kingdom—jumped on the
bandwagon.

10. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 1, 9 (2015),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FKR-TV9P].
11. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition,
and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 348 n.2 (2013).
12. Press Release, The Royal Swed. Acad. of Sci., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Econ. Sci. in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987 (Oct. 21, 1987), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/1987/press.html [https://perma.cc/S2UF-LG8F].
13. Graetz & Doud, supra note 11, at 348.
14. In addition to tax incentives, developing nations typically attempt to attract foreign direct
investment through privatizing various business sectors, lowering trade barriers such as tariffs,
investing in infrastructure, and reducing hassle costs. See Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant,
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1999, at 34,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm [https://perma.cc/8GLU-DFVV].
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Table – Patent Box Regimes15
Tax Rate
Country (Year
established)

IP Box

Corporate

In addition to
patents, what IP
qualifies?

Can the IP
be
acquired?

Does
existing
IP
qualify?

Ireland (1973,
2015)

6.25%

12.50%

Yes

Yes

France (2001,
2005, 2010)

15.50%

33.33%

Yes

Yes

Hungary (2003)

9.50%

19%

Computer
programs or IP
for small
companies
Supplementary
Protection
Certificates (SPC),
patentable
inventions,
manufacturing
processes
associated with
patents,
improvements of
patents
Secret formulas
and processes,
industrial designs
and models,
trademarks,
trade names,
copyrights
(including
software), knowhow, business
secrets

Yes

Yes

15
See Gordon Gray, Key Elements of a Potential U.S. Patent Box, AM. ACTION F. (Aug. 26,
2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/key-elements-of-a-potential-u-s-patent-box/
[https://perma.cc/PX3P-YJYQ]; see also #Luxleaks: The Reality of Tax ‘Competition’, UNCOUNTED
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://uncounted.org/2014/12/17/luxleaks-reality-tax-competition/ [https://
perma.cc/VN7S-25QR]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE 31
(2014) [hereinafter COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES], http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAsset-Management/oecd/taxation/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-intoaccount-transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report_9789264241190en#.Wa2X1siGPIU [https://perma.cc/85PP-4S2K]. Note that several of these jurisdictions have
modified or enacted a plan of transition for their box schemes to comply with this report.
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Belgium (2007)

6.80%

33.99%

Netherlands
(2007, 2010)

5%

25%

Luxembourg
(2008)

5.84%

29.22%

Spain (2008)

12%

30%

Malta (2010)

0%

35%

Liechtenstein
(2011)

2.50%

12.50%

Cyprus (2012)

2.50%

10%

[Vol. 41:1

SPC, certain
know-how
closely linked to a
patent of SPC
IP for which R&D
certificate has
been obtained
(includes
inventions,
processes,
technical
scientific
research,
designs, models,
certain software)
SPC, designs,
models, utility
models,
trademarks,
brands, domain
names,
copyrights on
software

No, unless
further
developed

No

No, unless
further
developed

No

Yes

Secret formulas
and procedures,
plans, models
Trademarks,
copyrights
(including
software)
Designs, models,
utility models,
trademarks,
copyrights
(including
software)
Secret formulas,
designs, models,
trademarks,
service marks,
client lists,
internet domain
names,
copyrights
(including
software), and
know-how

No

No,
unless
from a
related
company
and
acquired
after
2007
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No
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United
Kingdom (2013)

10%

23%

SPC, certain
other rights
similar to patents

Portugal (2014)

15%

30%

Models and
industrial
designs,
protected by IP
rights (excludes
explicitly
trademarks and
other IP)

185
No, unless
from
related
group that
developed
the IP and
acquiring
company
must
manage
use of the
patent
Yes

Yes

Yes

A. Other Countries
Nations such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia have
strong legal and regulatory environments in comparison to that of other
countries.16 These countries do not currently have a patent box regime, but
have considered it. These countries’ corporate tax regimes could be
amended; commentators have suggested that the lack of adoption of such
a regime could result in a loss of business and the possibility of losing
existing IP to countries that have more favorable tax regimes.17
B. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
The OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS was published in July 2013 with
a view to addressing perceived flaws in international tax rules. The
40 page Action Plan, which was negotiated and drafted with the
active participation of its member states, contained 15 separate action
points or work streams, some of which were further split into specific
actions or outputs. The Plan was squarely focused on addressing
these issues in a coordinated, comprehensive manner, and was

16. Jim Shanahan, Is It Time for Your Country to Consider the “Patent Box”?, PWC 1, 8 (May
23, 2011), http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_is_it_time_for_your_country_to_consider_the_
patent_box.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HVE-WQAL].
17. Id.
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endorsed by G20 leaders and finance ministers at their summit in St.
Petersburg in September 2013.18

The “primary aim is to address situations where profits are perceived
as geographically divorced from activities”19 and to “develop measures to
counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on investment and
financing decisions, and the consequences for national tax bases . . . .”20
While the language used was less than clear, the message was clear, and
rather than take their chances with parsing words, many countries have
decided to revise or abandon their plans for patent box schemes.
The . . . OECD . . . has called for a “nexus” approach to benefits
granted under such regimes as part of its package of final reports
under the OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.
Many countries are already amending or have amended their existing
patent box structures to align with the OECD’s nexus approach,
under which a company would have to locate its R&D and associated
jobs in the country offering the preferential tax rate in order to receive
the benefit.21

However, it is possible to design a box scheme that does not run afoul
of BEPS concerns. If we return to the basic question—whether it is
possible to encourage economic activity in a jurisdiction—we are not
automatically led to ignore the possibilities of a box scheme.
II.

WHY A COPYRIGHT BOX?

Any jurisdiction interested in economic growth through increased IP
development would do well to consider a few reasons why a copyright box
may be preferable to other types of boxes: (A) the copyright industry’s
contribution to GDP frequently rivals that of the patent industry (i.e.
copyrights produce as much revenue as patents); (B) a copyright
ecosystem may be easier to foster; (C) the legal system for a copyright box
is much easier to create and manage; and (D) the costs of a copyright
system are much less. Each of these points will be covered in turn.
18.
Base
Erosion
and
Profit
Shifting
(BEPS)
Action
Plan,
PWC,
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/tax-policy-administration/beps.html
[https://perma.cc/3WXH-K6NT].
19. Id.
20. Recommendation of the Council on Counteracting Harmful Tax Competition, ORG. FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.
(Apr.
9,
1998),
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=92&InstrumentPID=89&
Lang=en [https://perma.cc/PSC4-627Q].
21. Thinking Inside the Box: Why It’s Time to Pay Attention to Innovation/Patent Box Regimes,
EY
4
(2016)
[hereinafter
EY,
Thinking
Inside
the
Box],
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-thinking-inside-the-box/$FILE/EY-thinkinginside-the-box.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQ2-KWD6].

2017]

The Copyright Box Model

187

A. Copyright Contributions to GDP
Let’s return to Newland, a developing country that has decided it
wants to participate in some of the copyright industry’s22 growth.23 A look
at the copyright growth in the United States will help paint a clear picture
of the growth potentially available to Newland.
According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance the U.S.
copyright industry has grown almost three times as fast as the
economy as a whole for the past 20 years. In 1997, the total copyright
industries contributed an estimated US$ 529.3 billion to the U.S.
economy with the core copyright industries accounting for US$ 348.4
billion. Between 1977 and 1997, the absolute growth rate of value
added to the U.S. GDP by the core copyright industries was 241%.
Also the copyright industry’s foreign sales in 1997 (US$ 66.85 billion
for the core copyright industries) were larger than the U.S. Commerce
Department International Trade Administration’s estimates of the
exports of almost all other leading industry sectors. They exceeded
even the combined automobile and automobile parts industries, as
well as the agricultural sector.24

The copyright sector—those industries that produce and use
copyrights—is large, and the number of jobs and the value that they add
to the economies of the world is surprising. 25
22. Those industries that create copyrighted works as their primary product include the motion
picture industry (television, theatrical, and home video), the recording industry (records, tapes and
CDs), the music publishing industry, the book, journal, and newspaper publishing industry, the
software industry (including data processing, business applications and interactive entertainment
software on all platforms), the legitimate theater industry, the advertising industry, and the radio,
television, and cable broadcasting industries.
23. The International Intellectual Property Alliance determined that “value added to U.S. GDP
by the ‘total’ copyright industries in 2010 was $1.627 trillion, or 11.10% of U.S. GDP.” STEPHEN E.
SIWEK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2011
REPORT 4 (Nov. 2011), http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2011CopyrightIndustriesReport.PDF
[https://perma.cc/J2A2-VHXJ]. This agrees with WIPO’s assessment. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., WIPO STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 2–3 (2014)
[hereinafter WIPO STUDIES].
24.
The
Copyright
Industry,
WORLD-INFORMATION.ORG,
http://worldinformation.org/wio/infostructure/100437611725/100438658710/?ic=100446326381
[https://perma.cc/CJH2-7GGY].
25. See generally STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
U.S.
ECONOMY:
THE
2016
REPORT
(Dec.
2016),
IN
THE
http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016CpyrtRptFull.PDF [https://perma.cc/S8S7-JW8S]. “The ‘core’
copyright industries are those industries whose primary purpose is to create, produce, distribute or
exhibit copyright materials.” Id. at 1 n.1. These industries include computer software, videogames,
books, newspapers, periodicals and journals, motion pictures, recorded music, and radio and television
broadcasting. Id. at iii. Partial copyright industries “are industries in which only some aspect or portion
of the products that they create can qualify for copyright protection. These industries range from fabric
to jewelry to furniture to toys and games.” Id. at 2 n.3. Non-dedicated support industries include those
“that distribute both copyright and non-copyright protected materials to businesses and consumers.
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Evidence strongly suggests that workforce location is influenced by
innovation boxes.26 In addition, according to the OECD,27 research jobs in
member countries went from 2.8 million in 1995 to 4.2 million in 2007.28
Among the economies with greater than 200,000 researchers, they make
up the highest proportion of the workforce in Japan, South Korea, and the
United States29 The incentive for moving research overseas is proven by
further data from the Council on Foreign Relations.30 In recent years, U.S.
multinationals almost doubled their overseas R&D jobs, going from
137,800 in 2004 to 267,400 in 2009.31 However, they only created 22,300
new jobs domestically.32 The job creation by the patent box is undeniable,
but we should consider the potential job numbers from the copyright
industries.
Last year, for the first time ever, the copyright industries contributed
over $1 trillion to the U.S. economy.33 According to the International
Intellectual Property Alliance, in 2015, copyright industries accounted for
nearly 6.9% of GDP, which was nearly 4.6% of all private sector jobs (5.5
million) in the United States.34 In addition, from 2012 to 2015, copyright
Examples here include transportation services, telecommunications and wholesale and retail trade. As
in past studies, only a portion of the total value added by these industries is considered to be part of
the copyright industries.” Id.
Interdependent industries “include those that produce, manufacture, and sell equipment whose
function is primarily to facilitate the creation, production, or use of works of copyrighted matter. These
industries include manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of TV sets, personal computers[,]” and
usage dependent products, including blank recording material and certain categories of paper. Id. We
refer to the four groups together—core, partial, non-dedicated support, and interdependent—as the
“‘total’ copyright industries.” Id.
26. See W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne III, Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global Intellectual
Property Tax Incentives and Their Implications for the United States, 53 IDEA 371, 387 (2013);
ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, INFO. TECH. AND INNOVATION FOUND., PATENT BOXES:
INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY AND TAX POLICY FOR INNOVATION 1 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-box-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4W6-UJPW].
27. Current member countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States.
Members
and
Partners,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ [https://perma.cc/8ECB-ZWWF].
28.
Global
S&E
Labor
Force,
NAT’L
SCI.
FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c3/c3s5.htm#s3 [https://perma.cc/Z3H6-46CW].
29. Id.
30. Steven J. Markovich, Promoting Innovation Through R&D, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/innovation/promoting-innovation-through-rd/p29403 [https://
perma.cc/XSR9-65F8].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. David Newhoff, Spin This: Copyright Industries Grow at Twice the Rate of US Economy,
ILLUSION OF MORE (Nov. 19, 2013), http://illusionofmore.com/copyright-industries-economy/
[https://perma.cc/8N74-HKS7].
34. SIWEK, supra note 25, at 2.
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industries grew at an aggregate annual rate of 4.81%, which is more than
twice the rate of the U.S. economy overall (2.1%).35
Looking at the growth of the U.S. economy through its copyright
industries shows the potential growth for a developing country, such as
Newland. Newland could capitalize on some of this growth and increase
tax revenue by attracting FDI into their country through the tax incentives
a copyright box would provide. Those jurisdictions who think that they
might be settling for the “soft” IP instead of pursuing the “hard” IP of
patents would be well advised to examine just how large a contribution to
GDP the copyright industries make.
The following chart, created by the World Intellectual Property
Organization, shows the overall contribution to GDP and employment in
a number of countries36:

While IP-intensive industries accounted for 18.8[%] of all jobs in
the economy in 2010, their $5.06 trillion in value added in 2010
represented 34.8[%] of total GDP. This total share of GDP has
edged down since 2003. . . . Patent-intensive and copyrightintensive industries accounted for 5.3 and 4.4[%] of GDP, with
$763 billion and $641 billion in value added, respectively.37
35. Id. at 2, 7.
36. WIPO STUDIES, supra note 23, at 2.
37. ECON. AND STAT. ADMIN. & U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF COM.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 45 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79B8XY9Q].
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B. Copyright Box is Easier
A copyright box is easier to implement than a patent box. Consider
the fact that a patent box requires a patent regime. This means that
Newland would have to have, at the very least, a Patent Office and a staff
of examiners,38 a legal system that can handle infringement disputes,39 and
enough of an R&D ecosystem (including universities) to make the
jurisdiction attractive to outside interests.40 In addition, because no
investor is going to invest significant research dollars without legal
protections, Newland will also need a fairly significant business structure
regime. To the extent that these new regimes require court participation,
there will be a significant time and training expense required to prepare
Newland’s courts for the influx of novel cases it will inevitably see (not to
mention a waiting period while the first cases make their way through the
system).41 It will be tough to get early adopters to Newland.
Perhaps most importantly, the ecosystem necessary to support a
copyright box is much different than that for a patent regime. The types of
industries that create copyrights—authors and publishers, software
developers, designers, film and television producers, and artists,
musicians, and the recording industry—do not require near the
infrastructure that scientists do.42
The ecosystem also attracts a different type of consumer:

38. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 2 (2010).
39. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s ‘Renegade Jurisdiction’: Lessons for Patent Law
Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 142 (2008).
40. See, e.g., Christian A. Angotti, The Industry Too Big to Fall . . . Stumbling: Evaluating
Academia’s Use of Patent Rights and Its Consequential Effects on Public-Private Partnership
Negotiations with Pharmaceutical Companies, 18 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219 (2016).
41. The New Unified Patent Court in Europe, JONES DAY 1 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/e6e10384-c95e-4da1-b9ad5bf6ca044121/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7aa81706-3a18-43a6-be7b7ab19f9e7e38/New%20Unified%20Patent%20Court.pdf.
In assessing Europe’s new patent regime, the core change is not just the addition of a new
type of IP right. It is just as much about disempowering the national court systems and
entrusting patent litigation into a new (and untested) court system, with its structure and
rules of procedure built from scratch. This carries risks, as well as opportunities.
Id.
42. See Robert Spoo, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Scholarly Research and Copyright Case
Law Since 1992, 34 TULSA L.J. 183, 198 (1998) (“The progress of science and useful arts depends
vitally on the robust participation of the members of this ecosystem as well as on their ability to
exercise self-restraint. Righteous self-assertion and negative capability must work together to achieve
a delicate balance.”); Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project:
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1181 (2010) (“A successful copyright
‘ecosystem’ should nurture a diverse range of works. It should encourage creators to make and
disseminate new works of authorship and support readers, listeners, viewers, and other users in
experiencing those works.”).
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Certainly, users are rational consumers in many of their interactions
with creative expression. But at other times, users are deeply
passionate about creative work, and, given an opportunity to connect
with the creative process and a reason to do so, they will willingly
invest in creative production. Users—or, more accurately, fans—
fundamentally want to support artists.43

Attracting copyright creators is also a different process. Richard
Florida posits that the “creative class” flocks not to corporate communities
or traditional working centers, but instead to “creative centers.” “What
they look for in communities are abundant high-quality experiences, an
openness to diversity of all kinds, and, above all else, the opportunity to
validate their identities as creative people.”44
C. Copyright Regime
Copyright protection has influenced the intellectual, cultural, and
economic history of European and world society.45 At copyright’s earliest
point, English book printers and sellers created guilds that used private
agreements not to publish other members’ work.46 In 1557, a royal charter
was granted that reserved to members of the Stationers Company the
exclusive right to print works.47 The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710 by
British Parliament, is known as the world’s first official copyright
statute.48
However, since the early 1960s, international treaty negotiations
have underlined the differing opinions between developed and developing
countries on the copyright industry.49 Developing nations believe
intellectual property rights are excessively restricting the nation’s access
to technology.50 These growing nations do not want to be denied access to
technology or pay burdensome royalty and licensing fees.51 Developed
nations answer these arguments with the fact that intellectual property
43. Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright, 15
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 334 (2013).
44. Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class, 2 CITY & CMTY. 3, 9 (2003).
45. RUTH L. OKEDIJI, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS & PUBLIC INTEREST
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
1
(Mar.
2006),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3HF-5468].
46. Id. at 37 n.1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use–Analyzing the
Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 52 (2007).
50. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (2005).
51. Id.
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rights “protect their substantial investments in research and development
and offer a fair return for their efforts.”52 An example of this debate was
demonstrated when Taiwan passed legislation creating a new copyright
regime after being placed on the Priority Watch List by the United States
and receiving pressure from various intellectual property groups.53
For a nation that has never entered the world copyright stage,
implementing a copyright regime may be relatively easy. Model copyright
statutes are available.54 While a copyright office is necessary, the
workload, at least initially, is smaller.55
D. Budget
The U.S. Copyright Office receives approximately $52 million from
Congress and uses a staff of about 460 full-time equivalents.56 The U.S.
Copyright Office recorded 670,044 works in fiscal year 2011.57 By
comparison, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had 10,210
employees for the same time period.58 The PTO handled 536,604 patent
filings and 398,667 trademark filings.59 The PTO today is run 100% from
program fees, but for many years it operated in the red (today’s surplus is
due to an increase in user fees).60 For fiscal year 2011, the PTO’s total
program cost was $2,148,097,000.61 This means the PTO costs forty times
more than the Copyright Office to operate, and significantly, the PTO’s

52. Id.
53. Francis S.L. Wang & Laura W. Young, Taiwan’s New Copyright Regime: Improved
Protection for American Authors and Copyright Holders, 27 THE INT’L LAW. 1111, 1111 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Draft Law on Copyright Including Model Exceptions & Limitations for Libraries
and Their Users (Electronic Info. for Libraries, Work in Progress, 2016),
http://www.eifl.net/system/files/resources/201607/eifl_draft_law_2016_online.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KK7T-9SF6]; Kevin Smith, A Model Copyright Law, SCHOLARLY COMM. @ DUKE
(Aug. 22, 2009), http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2009/08/22/a-model-copyright-law/
[https://perma.cc/3B35-9ZRB].
55. See infra Part III.D.
56. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 9 (2011),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2011/ar2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLW8-8MBJ].
57. Id. at 43.
58. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 10 (2011)
[hereinafter
PERFORMANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT],
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QW43GQB4].
59. Id. Patent filings were at the office for an average of 33.7 months, and trademarks for an
average of 10.5 months. Id. at 14 tbl.2.
60. See PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 58, at 9 (“The USPTO has
evolved into a unique government agency. In 1991 – under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1990 – the USPTO became fully supported by user fees to fund its operations.”).
61. Id. at 76.
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most significant program cost is personnel services and benefits, which
comprise approximately 70% of PTO’s total program costs.62
In short, when we consider that: (1) copyrights produce the same
amounts of revenue as patents and trademarks; (2) a copyright ecosystem
and legal regime are simpler; and (3) a patent office can be up to forty
times more expensive, the justification for a copyright box is much easier.
III.

CRITICISMS OF BOXES

For all the benefits of boxes, they are not without drawbacks. One
concern is that the creation of new box schemes may reduce the value of
the already established box regimes in other countries. Another concern is
the loss of tax revenue relative to any forecast increase in investment or
business activity. More practically, the cost of implementing a new regime
is also prohibitive for both developed countries and underdeveloped
countries.
A. Value Decreases When the Number of Boxes Increase
Box regimes significantly affect decisions concerning the location of
new IP, but there can be a race to the bottom:
[W]hen the United Kingdom introduces a patent box regime, the
Benelux patent share will decrease (though it will still be greater
than the initial share). Therefore, the benefits to a nation of
introducing a patent box are diminished as more countries adopt
patent boxes. . . . [I]ntroduction of patent box regimes will
decrease patent revenue for all affected countries.63
Graetz and Doud’s research tends to support both the conclusion that
a copyright box would attract IP producers to a jurisdiction, and the
conclusion that the spoils go to the jurisdictions that act first. However, as
more jurisdictions adopt these types of schemes, the system becomes zerosum (or worse, it may become a race to the bottom if investors come to
expect lower taxes).
B. Loss of Revenue
The loss of revenue criticism of creating a box regime argues that the
developing nation will lose more in tax revenues than it gains in increased
direct investment and the related “spillover”—increased national
awareness, related infrastructure development, increased jobs for the local

62. Id. at 64.
63. Graetz & Doud, supra note 11, at 373.
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population, etc. Because the spillover effects are difficult to measure, this
argument is hard to prove or disprove.
The . . . argument, that tax incentives are ineffective and harmful
because their cost in forgone revenue exceeds their benefits, is also
problematic. If tax incentives are as ineffective as alleged, then no
harm is done. Investors are not attracted, behavior is not distorted,
and tax revenue is not forgone. Tax incentives cannot be harmful and
ineffective at the same time unless taxpayers can take advantage of
the tax incentives without actually investing, or unless investors who
would have made the investment even without the tax incentives
benefit from them.64

There are examples for both sides, which may suggest that the
criticism is misdirected. Obviously with a number of examples of
successful tax subsidy schemes, the underlying premise is sound: you can
offer a tax subsidy in exchange for direct investment and have it work to
the benefit of the developing country. However, the examples of failed
regimes also pose the warning corollary: you must design the scheme
carefully. It is possible to pay too much for the foreign investment,
resulting in harm to the jurisdiction.
C. Costs Associated with Creating a Box
1.

Infrastructure and Ecosystem

Patent boxes assume the very infrastructure necessary for their
creation. If a low-income country does not have a patent box because it is
poor, it probably has poor infrastructure and is not ready to attract hightech businesses.
Copyright boxes need infrastructure too, but specifically one that
encourages the production, distribution, and consumption of creative
works. “If the copyright system works like an ecosystem, the goal of
copyright law should be to encourage sustainable development of creative
resources in a way that provides incentives to creators, yet preserves the
resources essential for new creations.”65
2.

Problems with Proposed Boxes in the United States

In 2001, then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave
Camp proposed a limited patent box for the United States.66 The box
64. Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the
Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 182 (2003).
65. DEBORAH TUSSEY, COMPLEX COPYRIGHT: MAPPING THE INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM 2
(2012).
66. Graetz & Doud, supra note 11, at 369.
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would have been part of a larger corporate income tax reform, which
would have reduced the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% and provided
a 95% exemption for overseas profits when repatriated to the United
States.67 Specifically, the patent box was one of the alternatives the former
Chairman offered as an answer to the eroding tax base.68 The change
would have created a tax rate of 15% on this intangible income.69
Because it was part of a larger and quite costly tax reform package,
Camp’s proposal eventually died.70 However, others like it have been
proposed since 2011. In the summer of 2015, House Ways and Means
Committee Members Charles Boustany and Richard Neal proposed draft
legislation deemed the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015.71 The draft was
meant to encourage discussion and outlined a basic framework for the
creation of an innovation box in the United States.72 One problem was that
there was likely to be a substantial revenue loss.73 The United States is not
a developing nation, but does share a concern about the amount of foreign
investment directed to the United States compared with its trading
partners.74
D. Other Criticisms
1.

Addressing Other Needs

Historically, developed nations needed approximately 150 years to
establish a patent regime.75 Rushing to create an IP regime without
recognizing basic human needs may not be the wisest course of action:
67. Id.
68. Id. at 370.
69. Id.
70. See generally Alexandra Thornton, Patent Tax Dodge: Why the Patent Box Does Not Answer
America’s Need for Tax Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 1, 2015, 10:12 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2015/06/01/114088/patent-tax-dodge-whythe-patent-box-does-not-answer-americas-need-for-tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/4YW7-5LY9].
71. Michael Cohn, Congressmen Propose ‘Innovation Box’ to Lower Taxes on Intellectual
Property,
ACCOUNTING
TODAY
(July
29,
2015,
2:42
PM),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-practice/congressmen-propose-innovation-box-to-lowertaxes-on-intellectual-property-75342-1.html [https://perma.cc/C5CX-DLUQ].
72. JON TRAUB ET AL., DELOITTE, INNOVATION BOXES, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING: THE PILLARS OF THIS FALL’S TAX LEGISLATIVE DEBATE 1 (2015),
http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/tax/articles/innovation-boxes-international-tax-reform-andinfrastructure-spending.html?id=us:em:na:eng:tax:092815 [https://perma.cc/X42J-NC3U].
73. Id. at 9.
74. Graetz & Doud, supra note 11, at 351.
75. Srividhya Ragavan, Can’t We All Get Along? The Case for A Workable Patent Model, 35
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 149 (2003).
However, developing countries lack local manufacturing capabilities. Without aiding the
development of indigenous industries, the WTO policy merely facilitates trade. Devoid of
local manufacturing potential, mere trade will result in the loss of indigenous industries
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‘The core issue in developing countries is . . . the need for
infrastructure, the provision of basic human needs, the guarantee of
basic human rights, and the upward mobility [of people].’ The
economies of developing countries face crises similar to what
developed nations faced during the depression, including diseases,
overpopulation, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate
industrialization. ‘In light of such priorities, intellectual property
rights, divorced from [the] immediate needs of a country’ are a mere
luxury.76

2.

Short-Term Fixes

In addition, IP box schemes do not exist in a vacuum. Part of the
attractiveness depends on the interplay of other nations, including other
nations which may react to the creation of new legal schemes over time.
Some have warned that the benefits of changing regimes may only be seen
long-term and that other harms—including welfare losses,77 a
redistribution of wealth to more developed nations,78 or increased
competition with more powerful nations—may result.79
3.

Tax Incentives Distort Behavior

“Conventional wisdom weighs against using tax incentives to attract
investment in general and foreign direct investment in particular.
International organizations including the United Nations, World Bank,
IMF, OECD and the EU have unanimously opposed the use of tax
incentives to attract investments.”80
In any discussion of tax incentives—whether at the local, national or
global level—there is never a consensus that tax incentives are
appropriate. Critics of tax incentives, at least as a means to encourage
foreign investment, generally raise one of three issues: (1) tax incentives

and increased dependence on foreign companies. This will stunt the economies of
developing countries. Developing nations are currently not at the crossroads of
industrialization, where it makes sense to promote patent policies. Since developing
countries have nothing to trade and cannot afford to trade with developed nations, there is
a lack of logic in thrusting the TRIPS patent policy onto these nations.
Id. at 150.
76. Id. at 152 (quoting Ruth L. Gana, Prospects For Developing Countries Under The TRIPs
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 771 (1996)).
77. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 23 (2000).
78. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic
Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 472 (2001).
79. Ragavan, supra note 75.
80. Margalioth, supra note 64, at 181.
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distort behavior; (2) they are ineffective and harmful; and (3) tax
incentives are indirect solutions, and direct solutions are better.81
a.

Tax Incentives Distort Behavior

This argument is usually followed up by one of two conclusions, both
of which are seen as bad. First, distorting behavior is inefficient, as a
matter of economic analysis.
Second, distorting behavior does not solve the underlying problem,
which is that the jurisdiction is seeking to increase its desirability as a place
to invest and the incentives only serve as a false or temporary “fix.”
If developing countries could create good infrastructure, a highly
skilled labor force, zero inflation, a progressive tax and transfer
system, political stability, and a functioning judicial system, they
would not be developing countries; they would be the United
States. . . . Tax incentives are not used to attract FDI instead of
adopting sound policies and building good institutions, but in
addition to such efforts.82

b.

Tax Incentives Are Ineffective or Harmful

This type of argument focuses on the fact that a tax incentive, to the
extent the government agrees to forgo the collection of revenue, is roughly
equal (at least in some form) to a direct expenditure. If so, then would such
a direct expenditure survive a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis?83
It also involves the claim that tax incentives may harm the nature of
the tax system or the nature of the market that the tax incentive seeks to
influence (i.e. the market of foreign capital). “In theory, tax incentives
could be used to correct market failures or compensate for positive
externalities; however, it is impossible to trust governments and especially
those of developing countries to use tax incentives in such a way that will
exclusively achieve those goals.”84

81. See Avi Nov, Tax Incentives to Entice Foreign Direct Investment: Should There Be A
Distinction Between Developed Countries and Developing Countries?, 23 VA. TAX REV. 685, 688
(2004).
82. Margalioth, supra note 64, at 184.
83. See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 714 (1970).
84. Nov, supra note 81, at 700.
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Direct Measures Are Better

“[E]mpirical findings from a panel of 19 OECD countries indicated
that direct support seems to have a larger impact than R&D tax
incentives . . . .”85
This, of course, is balanced by the relative ease that tax measures
have in terms of having the bureaucratic infrastructure in place and a
certain measure of non-transparency.86
4.

Responses

Tax incentives are designed to distort behavior. If the behavior were
working in the way the designers of the tax system wanted, there would
be no reason to try to influence it. However, if the desired behavior (i.e.
increased revenues from copyright license fees) cannot be sustained
without the tax system “priming,” then the criticism about harm and
effectiveness takes on new importance.
In many cases, however, governments are trying to overcome natural
or external deficiencies in the market. There is a balance that needs to be
drawn when implementing new tax incentives. On the one hand, such
measures (hopefully!) are temporary as a way to jump-start industry and
investment. On the other hand, temporary measures are inefficient because
investors tend to feel skittish about measures that may disappear. As a
result, it is fair to question the efficacy and wisdom of adopting
“permanent” temporary tax incentives to jump start the production of IP.
China’s Effectiveness in Attracting FDI
There is a world of data examining the factors that may affect an
investor’s decisions regarding the chosen location of investment.87
Surveys of investors have shown that “‘tax exemption is like a dessert; it
is good to have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there.’”88
That data shows that tax incentives are important to have, but they are not
a deciding factor to an investor.89 On the other hand, surveys of
85. Elīna Gaillard & Bas Straathof, Will R&D Tax Incentives Get Europe Growing Again?,
VOXEU.ORG (Jan. 20, 2015), http://voxeu.org/article/rd-tax-incentives-new-evidence-trends-andeffectiveness [https://perma.cc/TBL9-GLRE].
86. See, e.g., Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for
International Tax Debates, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 689–90 (2007).
87. Id. at 681–84.
88. Id. (quoting Jacques Morisset & Neda Pirnia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign
Direct Investment: A Review 5 (The World Bank and Int’l Fin. Corp. Foreign Inv. Advisory Serv.,
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
2509,
2000),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19742/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/66C3-UTV3]).
89. Id.
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government officials have ranked tax incentives as a key factor in
attracting FDI.90
China is the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries and
has received exponential growth over the past thirty years.91 Over this
time, China has offered generous tax incentives to FDI, which can lead to
the conclusion that China’s tax incentives were a significant factor in
attracting FDI.92 Most Chinese scholars and international scholars
generally share in this assessment and attribute China’s growth in FDI to
its generous tax incentives.93 Further, an apparent correlation exists
between FDI and the Chinese location-specific and activity-specific tax
incentives offered: over 70% of FDI has been in manufacturing,94 and over
80% of FDI in China was invested in the coastal areas.95 “However, using
the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness of tax incentives
is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of FDI inflow that would not
have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives.”96
The European Union has conducted a survey on the factors
influencing investors’ decisions to invest in China.97 Ninety-one percent
of investors put incentive packages on a medium or higher position and
41% considered them highly important.98 However, this study does not
explicitly speak to whether it was tax incentives that played a critical role
in choosing China. Ultimately, the data and studies suggest that tax
incentives play a part in an investor’s locale decisions, at least in China,
but the criticism does not offer a clear picture as to how important they
really are.
IV.

BACK TO BEPS

The OECD began working on addressing the issue of harmful tax
competition in the late 1990s and released a report in 1998.99 The OECD
90. See generally Jacques Morisset, Using Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment
1 (Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Group, Note No. 253, 2003),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/2828841303327122200/253Moris-020603.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5BN-TC6F].
91. Li, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. OECD Releases Final Report on Countering Harmful Tax Practices Under Action 5, EY
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert—oecd-releases-finalreport-on-countering-harmful-tax-practices-under-action-5 [https://perma.cc/5AH9-QPCQ]; see
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL
ISSUE
19–25
(1998)
[hereinafter
OECD,
HARMFUL
TAX
COMPETITION],
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nations were worried about “base erosion” and “tax flight”—that
companies headquartered in their jurisdictions would use IP boxes to
escape tax in their home countries. The OECD reports were noticeably
vague, but centered on two types of threats: “Tax havens” and “harmful
tax competition.” Trying to define what constituted a tax haven or harmful
tax competition when the OECD nations themselves engaged in tax
competition proved difficult.100 After all, not everyone thinks that “tax
havens” are “wrong.”
This campaign against low-tax jurisdictions is fundamentally
misguided. Tax havens (to use the pejorative term coined by
proponents of big government) have a valuable role in the global
economy. They provide a low-tax platform for economic activity.
They facilitate the efficient allocation of capital. They encourage the
accumulation of capital. And, because of tax competition, they
encourage better tax law in the rest of the world.101

A. Where is the “Harm”?
On April 18, 2002, the OECD issued its most recent list—the List of
Uncooperative Tax Havens. In a statement issued on the day the list
was issued, OECD Deputy Secretary-General, Seiichi Kondo,
expressed his sorrow that the seven jurisdictions on the list had
‘decided that it is not in their interest to join OECD countries and
other members of the international community in ending harmful tax
practices that facilitate tax cheating and distort the market for
financial services.’ . . . By providing a framework within which all
countries—developed and developing—can work together to fight
harmful tax practices, the OECD seeks to encourage transparent and
fair tax competition.102

However, not everyone bought the story that the OECD had global
welfare in mind with this project:
http://www.uniset.ca/microstates/oecd_
44430243.pdf [https://perma.cc/57YK-SDB8].
100. See, e.g., Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L.
411, 472–74 (2004).
101. DANIEL J. MITCHELL, THE MORAL CASE FOR TAX HAVENS 3 (2006),
http://www.fnf.org.ph/downloadables/Moral%20Case%20for%20Tax%20Havens.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LVJ5-8SHF].
102. Vaughn E. James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen Caricom Countries of Their Tax and
Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002). The OECD is obviously
concerned about the effects of globalization, and about the flow of capital from the industrialized
countries to the so-called tax havens. As regards the former, Mr. Kondo is clear: “Globalization has
enormous potential to improve living standards around the world. But it also brings risks, including
the risk of abuses of the free market system.” Id.
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Given this significant fiscal dependence, any loss of competitiveness
in the financial services sector resulting from the OECD’s actions
would have catastrophic results. It is reported that these developing
nations could realize as much as a 25% decrease in GDP should they
alter their current tax practices to adhere to OECD guidelines. Such
striking losses would lead to an economic collapse devastating
enough to return these offshore tax havens to their total dependence
on highly unstable industries. Consequently, all recent attempts to
achieve the economic development, stability, and independence
sufficient to control poverty and other social ailments experienced by
these nations would be throttled.103
[T]he Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) effort to stamp out tax competition . . . . is designed in effect
to create a tax cartel and, if the OECD succeeds, [these nations] will
face the risk of higher taxes and a weakened economy while
developing nations will be hamstrung in their attempts to promote
economic growth . . . . Tax competition is a strong factor in both
maintaining and increasing the vibrancy of economies across the
globe . . . . The OECD is even trying to impose its will on nations that
are not members of the organization, calling for draconian sanctions
against so-called tax havens. This is troubling on several levels.
Sovereign nations should be free to determine their own tax policies
. . . and it hardly seems right for us to participate in a campaign to
force other nations to change their tax laws.104

B. Nexus Approach
“The nexus approach focuses on establishing a nexus between
expenditures, these IP assets, and income. Under the nexus approach,
marketing-related IP assets such as trademarks can never qualify for tax
benefits under an IP regime.”105
Why?
The criticisms against the OECD approach are many.106 At its core,
the OECD seems afraid that R&D centers, once housed in the OECD
103. Richard A. Johnson, Why Harmful Tax Practices Will Continue After Developing Nations
Pay: A Critique of the OECD’s Initiatives Against Harmful Tax Competition, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 351, 362 (2006).
104. Alexander Townsend, Jr., Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 215 (2001) (citing Letter from Rep. Richard K. Armey, Congress of the United
States, House of Representatives, to Lawrence Summers, United States Department of Treasury, Tax
Notes Today, Sept. 7, 2000).
105. COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 15.
106. See Littlewood, supra note 100, at 416 (citing Hugh Ault, Tax Competition: What (If
Anything) To Do About It?, in 26 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TAXATION: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF KLAUS VOGEL 1 (Paul Kirchhof et al. eds., 2002); RAJIV BISWAS, INTERNATIONAL TAX
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nations, could move (or have their income centers move) to non-OECD
nations. Thus, the term BEPS was born.
The problem with the OECD’s report on Action 5 is one of
perspective. Do box schemes hurt OECD members? Probably. Is the
OECD justified in taking action to protect its members? Also, probably
yes. Does that mean that the OECD policy is right? No.
Even were we to assume that the OECD statement is correct—that
harmful tax competition arises when the locus of income and expenditure
are different—we are not correct in assuming (which the OECD has
blindly done) that patents are the only IP which will qualify for acceptable
IP schemes. In fact, the OECD report paints a stark picture between patent
and patent-type assets and so-called “marketing-related” trademarks, but
they completely ignore copyrights, except for software copyrights.107
So, we are left to answer the question for ourselves: Do copyright
boxes constitute harmful tax competition?
C. Copyright Boxes and the OECD
1.

Territoriality

Despite the stated goal of the OECD reports to establish “a nexus
between expenditures, these IP assets, and income,” the OECD, in a most
non-transparent way, excludes all assets that are not patents or
“functionally equivalent” to patents. We can see why the OECD would
want to ban trademarks because their value very easily applies to
multinational entities as a whole, as opposed to having a value that “lives”
in one jurisdiction alone.

COMPETITION: GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY (2002); WOLFGANG SCHON, TAX
COMPETITION IN EUROPE (2003); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition and E-Commerce, 23 TAX
NOTES INT’L 1395 (2001); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax, Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition: Reflections
on the FSC Controversy, 21 TAX NOTES INT’L 2841 (2000); Kimberly Carlson, When Cows Have
Wings: An Analysis of the OECD’s Tax Haven Work as it Relates to Globalization, Sovereignty, and
Privacy, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163 (2002); Frances M. Horner, Do We Need an International Tax
Organization?, 24 TAX NOTES INT’L 179 (2001); Javier Salinas, The OECD Tax Competition
Initiative: A Critique of its Merits in the Global Marketplace, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 531 (2003);
Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and
Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (2002); Townsend, Jr., supra note 104; David R.
Burton, Towards a Global Tax Cartel, POL’Y MAG., Summer 2002–03, at 9; Terry Dwyer, The New
Fiscal Imperialism, POL’Y MAG., Summer 2002–03, at 12).
107. And they even get that wrong. “[T]axpayers in the software industry are unlikely to
outsource the development of their core software to unrelated parties.” COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES, supra note 15, para. 36.
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Recall that the OECD concern was of shifting profits away from the
jurisdiction that created them. Moving a trademark or creating a new
trademark does not mitigate against the fact that trademarks apply
universally (especially in a connected, digital world). If Apple were to
create a new trademarked logo in a developing world, users across the
globe would notice and, presumably, the value would increase the value
of all subsidiaries.
Copyrights, like patents, are much more territorial and can frequently
be tied to tangible media (or at least media that behaves in territorial ways).
Copyrights can be controlled.
2.

“Rightly Belongs”

[The OECD] acknowledged, for example, that, ‘at certain stages’ of
development, tax incentives might be ‘justifiable from the point of
view of the country in question’—but this is hardly an enthusiastic
endorsement. Moreover, the OECD seems to regard any shifting of
investment as suspect. It alludes to countries ‘bidding aggressively’
for other countries’ tax bases and of countries ‘poaching’ a tax base
that ‘rightly belongs’ to another country and concludes that ‘such
practices would be doubtlessly labeled “harmful tax competition”.’
But none of these terms— ‘bidding aggressively,’ ‘poaching,’
‘rightly belongs’—is defined.108

Patents may be the easiest type of IP to trace its development.
Scientists and researchers frequently keep logs and journals, so
expenditures for equipment and costs can be apportioned.109 Trademarks,
as have been discussed, are not as easy to divide, even if the activity to
create them occurs in only one jurisdiction. Copyrights can produce
similar questions, as will be shown in the next section.
3.

Substantiality

In addition, the absence of a requirement that the activity be
substantial is important because it suggests that a jurisdiction may be
attempting to attract investment and transactions that are purely tax
driven. It may also indicate that a jurisdiction does not (or cannot)
provide a legal or commercial environment or offer any economic
advantages that would attract substantive business activities in the
absence of the tax minimising opportunities it provides. The
determination of when and whether an activity is substantial can be
difficult. For example, financial and management services may in
108. Littlewood, supra note 100, at 465.
109. But not always easily. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent
Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
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certain circumstances involve substantial activities. However, certain
services provided by ‘paper companies’ may be readily found to lack
substance.110

The substantial activity factor assumes that if activities (and related
expenditures) occur within a jurisdiction, then the resulting IP must
“rightly belong” there as well. This assumption does not always hold true
for patents (researchers can bring knowledge with them to a new
jurisdiction), but infringement, breach of non-compete agreements, and
trade secret protection is usually felt to police serious violations.
How should copyrights fare under this scrutiny? There are two
considerations. While copyrights have a lower standard of innovation,
“patent law’s standards of novelty, non[-]obviousness, and utility set a
high bar for protectability. That elevated standard accords with society’s
frequent willingness to adopt groundbreaking inventions. By contrast,
copyright’s standard of originality sets the bar much lower, making it easy
for artistic works to gain protection.”111
With a lower standard for protectability, it could be argued that some
value created in a high-tax jurisdiction could be transferred to a low-tax
jurisdiction, even with economic activity occurring in the low-tax
jurisdiction. However, copyright requires “fixing” the creative endeavor
in a tangible medium (writing, recording, filming, etc.).112 If the “fixing”
activities occur in the low-tax jurisdiction, the risks of tax flight are the
same as for patents.
The second consideration is that copyrights are much more “mobile.”
Consider the following:
Example 1. J, a Korean pop star, decides to travel to country X,
which offers a copyright box with lower income rates than Korea for
qualifying copyright royalties. J composes 12 songs and licenses those
songs to a corporation formed in X.
Example 2. N, a well-known creator of a popular American drama,
also decides to travel to X to produce the third season of the drama.
Example 3. P, a German software developer, also relocates to X
while in the middle of creating what turns out to be a very popular app.

110. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 99, at 24.
111. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445
(2010).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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In each of these examples, it can be argued that some of the value of
the resulting copyrights started in another country and, therefore, the move
to X resulted in base erosion. However, it can also be argued that
“substantial domestic activities” have occurred, which are “legally
protected.”113 Is this harmful tax competition? How can that argument
stand, given that copyright industries rely much less on R&D
infrastructure and much more on “artistic works?”114
V.

DESIGNING A BOX

Assuming that a nation decides that a box is the right strategy and
that a copyright box is the correct vehicle, there remain several issues in
the design of the box that bear mention. Who are the targeted taxpayers?
What kind(s) of IP qualify? Which items of income and expense are
affected by the regime and what will be the tax benefit? Where must the
IP and related activities be located? How will all of this affect a
jurisdiction’s other incentives for innovation?
A. Qualifying Taxpayers
A new copyright box regime would need to address whether
domestic as well as foreign entities (and/or individuals) would be eligible
to participate. There is more control if only domestic entities can
participate, as foreign companies would then need a domestic subsidiary
(which allows the jurisdiction more control). Some countries limit
participation by foreign taxpayers to those with a permanent establishment
in the country and who come from a jurisdiction with a tax treaty with the
home country.115
Additionally, there should be thought given as to whether the benefits
are available to corporations only to the exclusion of individuals (or small
businesses) and pass-through entities,116 as this can influence not only the
focus and the marketing of the regime, but also its cost. Pass-through
entities can allow the tax benefits to flow in ways that might violate the
OECD recommendations or to flow outside the jurisdiction.
Finally, some thought should be given to limiting the ability of the
entity receiving tax benefits to leave the jurisdiction, possibly by the use
113. The requirement that such activities be subject to “approval and registration processes”
seems to be only for protectionism’s sake. As mentioned earlier, patent systems are much more costly
to run and, therefore, requiring approval processes is only an argument for bureaucracy.
114. Fromer, supra note 111, at 1454.
115. See, e.g., Patent Box – Tax Benefits on the Use and Transfer of Intangible Assets
(Trademarks, Patents, Industrial Processes), INVEST IN LOMBARDY (June 10, 2015, 4:05 PM),
http://www.investinlombardyblog.com/en/2015/06/patent-box-tax-benefits-on-the-use-and-transferof-intangible-assets-trademarks-patents-industrial-processes/ [https://perma.cc/DPW6-44LZ].
116. EY, Thinking Inside the Box, supra note 21.
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of agreements with a claw-back provision (i.e. if an entity attempts to: (1)
move to another jurisdiction; (2) a significant percentage of its activities
are no longer conducted in the jurisdiction; or (3) a significant percentage
of shares are held by residents of other countries, then the tax benefits
accrued must be repaid).
B. Qualifying IP
Basic questions in the design of a copyright box scheme include what
types of copyrights to include. Software is different from film, which is
different from music. Do all types of copyrights qualify?
There is also the question of whether all or a majority of the activities
to create, produce, or distribute the media have to occur in the jurisdiction,
and what do we mean by production activities or creation activities?
Sometimes inspiration strikes and a hit song is written in an evening. Has
the creative activity occurred in the jurisdiction even if the song is about a
painful relationship that just ended elsewhere?117 Does the writer have to
establish residency first? Should work performed outside the jurisdiction
where the box is located qualify (because many creative endeavors require
a team)?
Finally, copyrights have a long shelf life. Are acquired copyrights
included in the box? Consider the following scenarios from Newland:
- A Newland corporation buys or licenses the Newland copyright
from an American author.
- A Newland corporation acquires a record label from Germany and
then proceeds to register the copyrights in Newland.
- A Newland corporation hires an indie director to produce a
Newland version of a popular movie the director made in Spain.
All are arguably “new” and original in Newland and would increase
the ecosystem of creativity. Do they meet the standard of substantiality?
Would they be considered “poaching” of the creative work of the citizens
of another jurisdiction? Does the scheme encourage forum shopping or
certain sham transactions, where existing copyright assets are simply
placed in a subsidiary within the copyright box jurisdiction to take
advantage of the tax savings? Does the income from foreign copyrights
qualify?
Further, translation rights are an important feature to consider
including in the box.118 New translation rights have been a significant
benefit to American authors translating to Taiwanese.119 The same benefit
could be implemented for authors needing an English translation. Another
117. You want the jurisdiction to be known for copyrights, not breakups, right?
118. Wang & Young, supra note 53, at 1114–15.
119. Id.
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consideration is choosing the remedies for infringement available for
copyright holders.120 Lastly, what terms of protection will be offered for
copyright holders?121 This important feature offers an incentive for the life
of the copyright.
C. Qualifying Income and Expenditures
1.

Expenses

Expenses related to creative endeavors have always proved difficult
for tax systems because the dividing line between allowable expenses and
personal, non-tax expenses is never clear. Also, allocating expenses
between multiple, on-going projects can be difficult.
Further, for individuals and entities engaged in multiple projects,
there can be expenses that do not directly relate to any particular property
(e.g. interest, rent, utilities, insurance, and salaries). These need to be
factored in, especially if the expenses occur in a separate year from the
development of the IP.
2.

Income

Different jurisdictions define income differently. Whether income
includes just royalties or also includes services income, income from
embedded product sales, or capital gains from the sale of IP (whether or
not the jurisdiction normally recognizes capital gains) is a matter to
consider. Income definitions not only affect the IP regime but also affect
transfer pricing (in the case of subsidiaries with offshore parents).
Capturing too little of the income leaves potential revenues on the table,
while capturing too much can brand the jurisdiction as a tax haven (lower
taxes on income that is not matched to qualifying expenses).
In addition, outsourcing also creates issues for the development of a
box scheme. Are the expenses and income of unrelated entities who
perform work for a taxpayer to be treated the same as related parties? In a
copyright context, providing for outsourced labor (a production studio, for
example) may well play into the strategy of attracting new talent and
investment to the jurisdiction, but does it raise the question of
substantiality because there would be less direct involvement in the
process by “new” participants?
Does the regime require that taxpayers maintain all relevant
information for determining the allocation of income to the innovation box

120. Id. at 1117–19.
121. Id. at 1116.
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regime? Is there a provision for information sharing with other tax
authorities?
CONCLUSION
Countries have been attempting to use a patent box regime as a tax
incentive to bring large, IP producing companies within their borders and
add to their tax base. However, a copyright box does not demand an
already thriving and sophisticated infrastructure, and it has the potential to
generate as much—if not more—revenue than a patent box, making the
copyright box highly attractive to developing countries.
A copyright box may be quicker to implement, easier to administer,
and requires a smaller budget. Those interested in creating, producing, and
distributing copyrights may be more mobile, as projects can be more
discrete. In short, a copyright box may be an easier step to attracting
foreign investment.
While much of the attention has been directed to patents and “hightech” box schemes, developing nations would be well served to consider
copyrights and their potential effect on GDP. A copyright box has the
potential to attract foreign investment, copyright creators and their related
industries, and increased growth without the level of infrastructure needed
for other types of IP.

